God's knowledge of future contingencies

Taken from Turretin in rough outline form:

A thing may be contingent in two ways:

• by depending on God as first cause (as all of creation is thus contingent, since God didn't have to create)
• by depending on prior second causes (which produce or not produce their effects).  Turretin is speaking these contingents.

A future contingent implies both certainty of event and mode of production.  As future it is certain, but as contingent in its mode of production.   It has the former from the decree of the First Cause, the latter from the constitution of the second cause.

The mode of production is clarified by the Westminster Confession of Faith V.2:  It identifies God as the First Cause, corresponding with the first point made by Turretin, but notes that the First Cause orders the events to happen in three modes:  freely, necessarily, or contingently. 

See also:  necessity of the consequence (contingent) and necessity of the consequent thing (absolute)

An event can be both infallibly certain yet contingent.  Thus, all things take place by the necessity of consequence, not the necessity of the consequent.  Turretin notes that man's actions can be free because they are spontaneous and follow rational judgment, but necessary because of God's decree (I: 211). 


 

In Defense of Calvinist International on the Patristic Critique of Icons

A few days ago Steven W. gave a brief, but admirable summary of some earlier Patristic witnesses against the veneration of icons in the early church.  Granted, he wasn't writing a monograph and I think some of the claims could be developed a bit further, but as it stands it does provide a window into some aspects of church life.  

It has since come to the attention of a few Eastern Orthodox apologists.  In my post I plan to 1) consider the claims of both Wedgeworth and the EO interlocutor, and 2) offer my own historical conclusions on the matter.  Note:  I said historical conclusions, not dogmatic assertions.   If in response I am labeled "Nestorian" or "Monophysite," so what?  My interest is in examining some early church witnesses, not in the larger theology behind iconodulism.  

What Calvinist International Actually Said

CI simply notes a handful of pre-Nicene fathers and councils that express either reticence or disapproval with the use of icons.   Perhaps they could have further clarified their terms by saying some parts of the earlier church disapproved of icons.  I think such a clarification would have blunted future criticisms.   Be that as it may, Steven has produced incontrovertible evidence that Tertullian, Council of Elvira, Gregory the Great, and Epiphanius disapproved of the veneration of icons.  Note the qualification of terms:  we are not claiming that the early church fathers were Scottish Calvinists enforcing the RPW.  Having a picture of Jesus and actively venerating it are two separate issues.   Still, the fact remains that these historical witnesses disapproved of veneration.  The import of this claim will be revealed below.

The Eastern Orthodox Response

The EO interlocutor responds:

Does the evidence put forth by Pr Wedgeworth demonstrate that there has always been an equal opposition to icons and their veneration within the Orthodox-Catholic Church? Is that evidence being properly represented and understood? Were they isolated voices, or part of a large opposition to icons in the history of the Church?

I don't think Pr. Wedgeworth is actually claiming a continual and equal opposition.   I have my own conclusions on the matter, but I think he is simply noting an early and substantial, although admittedly limited in scope opposition. 

The interlocutor then responds to Wedgeworth's use of Peter Brown's scholarship.  I am going to leave that aside for the moment.  My own particular conclusions do not rest on Brown.    The EO apologist notes that Rome, and thus the West, was represented at 2nd Nicea.  True, and I have my own thoughts on that as well. 

He goes on to write,

While the iconoclastic controversy itself was originally rooted in the eastern part of the empire, its resolution was an ecumenical one; a resolution that had the full support of the entire Catholic Church (as shown in Basil’s confession). The life and witness of the Orthodox-Catholic Church since the 9th century confirms this to be the case, over and against any ahistorical or abstract inquiries into isolated statements, both before and after that time.  (emphasis added)

No one denies that Orthodoxy has been iconodulic since the 9th century.   His sentence in that quote, though, does not follow.   He asserts that Steven's inquiry is ahistorical, yet he is the one casually dismissing Brown's evidence.   Who's acting ahistorically?  Further, he simply precludes (without epistemological warrant) any historical investigation into the matter.   This is ultimately what turned me off to anchoretism.  Whenever historical, biblical, or logical anamolies were brought into the equation, they are simply dismissed.

Continuing,

When attempting to understand both Patristic writings and the Holy Scriptures, it is necessary to do so within a right context; and that right context is the life of the Church, not our best guess at its reconstruction

The irony is that the easy access all traditions have to Patristic literature today is largely a result of the "reconstruction" of the German Calvinist Phillip Schaff.  

then there would’ve been a palpable outcry of opposition at the very onset of their introduction. By most standards, the introduction of iconography into the usage of the Church is seen to have occurred between the first and fourth centuries AD. As a result, any evidence related to icons during this period should be examined with this kept in mind. If icons were introduced during this time frame, and there is not an overwhelmingly violent reaction to such innovation and idolatry in the writings of the Fathers, what could one be led to conclude?

The problem, though, is "what counts as outcry?"  Evidently, Tertullian, Epiphanius, and Gregory the Great, not to mention Elvira, do not.  Why not?   

My Own Historical Conclusions

One of the apologetic claims of many Anchorites is that they have the faith once delivered to the saints, which faith is evident "everywhere, at all times, and by all."   Of course, no one means this literally.  We certainly account for folks here and there dissenting.  My contention, however, is that the above-cited men do function as reliable historical witnesses to the life of the earlier church.   Yes, Tertullian slipped into heresy, but few deny his value as a historical witness.     It has been pointed out that the Council of Elvira was only a local council and not binding on all Christians.  True, but the fact that it was a Council and not merely an individual, does indicate that it reliably reports the church practices of a significant amount of Christians in a time and place.   This is particularly devastating to the traditional argument  for icons:  we have here a noticeable example of counter-evidence.  

The historical problem becomes thus: if iconodulism is part of the faith once delivered to all the saints, and if Vincent's canon applies, then we must account for the fact that we have a substantial section of the church ruling against icons and no one says a word about it.  The EO interlocutor says that if icons were forbidden, then why wasn't there an outcry?  Well, there was.  See: Elvira, Epiphanius, and Gregory, not to mention the Council of Heira.  Yes, it might have been a robber baron's council, but it was still a noticeable outcry.

Rome and Icons

He notes that Rome supported the conclusions of 2nd Nicea.  True, but Rome applied it differently.   The Carolignian Church was hesitant about venerating icons.  Charlemagne was suspicious of the East at this time (see Joseph Farrell's work).

Some Notes from Augustine

Granted, Eastern Orthodox guys do not like Augustine.  The fact remains, though, that Orthodox councils have called him a saint.   Regardless, he functions as a good historical witness.  He writes,

If this were not the case (e.g., the reasoning faculty is in no way subordinate to human authority) there would be no heretics, no schismatics, no circumcised in the flesh, no creature- and icon worshippers (The True Religion, 24.45-25.47, quoted in Vernon Bourke, The Essential Augustine, 33).

Again,

For it is unlawful for a Christian to set up any image of God in a temple... (On Faith and the Creed, ca. 8, NPNF Series II: vol. 3: 327)
 

Scholasticism and Causation as a Theological Tool

The scholastics, both Protestants and Catholics, picked up Aristotle's Four-fold causation, though the Protestants would make one key adaptation.  The example being used is that of wood and a tree.

1. Material cause:  matter itself is a cause of change.  The wood itself is involved in the cause.
2. formal cause:  The table is "imprinted" on the wood, so that the form is a cause of change of the matter.
3. Final Cause:  The goal of the wood.  Potency thus becomes actuality (The Reformed would qualify this, though, for we note that not all potencies are actualized.  )
4. The efficient cause:  the furniture maker.

The Reformed would add one more category:  the instrumental cause.  Van Asselt describes this as a subordinate efficient cause (40).  God is the efficient cause of all that takes place in reality, and in particular The Holy Scriptures (cf. Muller, PRRD II).  Yet humans are not merely passive in salvation (thus rebutting the monothelite charge), and thus human action is the causa instrumentalis of salvation. This distinction is of utmost importance.   If humans were the efficient cause, then they are causing their own salvation; thus the Reformed do not go beyond the causa instrumentalis.

This is seen in debates over Paul/James and Faith Alone.   I will say more of this when I deal with Maccovius' use of categoremata and syncategoremata.  Suffice to say, if someone asks the Reformed Scholastic, "Do you believe in faith alone, contra James 2?" the answer is, "It depends on how the terms are being used."   Do I believe in works-salvation?   If one is referring to final causality, then yes!  Ephesians 2:10 says we are created for (final cause) good works.   If one is referring to causa instrumentalis, then the answer is no.

Turretin on different types of freedom

The more I read of Richard Muller and other exponents of Reformed Scholasticism, the more I realize that the Reformation tradition had a rich and full understanding of freedom of choice.  The following is taken from Willem J. van Asselt's Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism.

Contrary to Arminian and Catholic charges, the Reformed view of a "necessary" will is not incompatible with "freedom," provided both terms are understood correctly. Francis Turretin provides six different types of "necessity," four of which the Arminian/Romanist must affirm are compatible with freedom: 1) necessity of dependence of the creature on God; 2) [Asselt intended to list the second type of necessity, but I don't think he did], 3) every creature is dependent on God in terms of the future per God's foreknowledge and decree. 3a) Asselt writes, "However great the creature's freedom may be, these acts are still necessary from this perspective, otherwise God's foreknowledge could be false and his decree changeable." 4) free will must go with rational necessity, for must not a free action be a rational one? 5) Free will relates to moral necessity, or that of habit. If you do an action enough, whether good or bad, it becomes a habit, making it easier to do this action. Few will deny this observation. 6) The necessity of an event or the existence of a thing. If a thing is, it is necessarily.  This is an example of a necessity of the consequence.   It is not an absolute necessity.

In short, freedom can be determined because freedom is not absolute (Asselt, 162-163).

Necessity of the Consequent, Consequence

The necessity of the consequent is the necessity of a proposition behind the "then" in an if...then statement. The necessity of the consequence is the consequence itself. Ie, the implicative necessity. In the implicative necessity, neither the antecedent nor the consequent needs to be necessary. Only the necessity of the implicative relation counts. Take the two propositions:

(1) If I marry Marian, then Marian is my wife.
(2) It is necessary that Marian is my wife (if I marry her).

In proposition (1) it is contingent that I marry Marian. I did not have to do so. Only the implication between the antecedent and consequent is necessary. In proposition 2 it is the result of the conditional proposition that is necessary.

Proposition 1 does not imply proposition 2. Therefore, in an argument of implicative relation of necessity, both the antecedent and consequent can be contingent and not necessary. According to the Reformed scholastics, the necessity of the consequence corresponds with absolute necessity and the necessity of the consequent with hypothetical necessity. In this distinction, the Reformed scholastics combat the charge that the divine decree destroys the contingency and freedom of the world. Therefore, necessity and contingency are compatible and not contradictory.

Most important in this distinction is that it depends on God's will ad extra. If the decision of the divine will is directed to contingent objects ad extra, then God's will is contingent, too. In other words, God contingently wills all that is contingent. Created reality, therefore, is the contingent manifestation of divine freedom and does not necessarily emanate from God's essence. For if this were the case, all things would coincide fundamentally with God's essence, and the actual world would be eternal (198-199).

Affirming the Consequent fallacies in Anchoretic Apologetics

Affirming the consequent is a logical fallacy that takes the following form:

If p, then q;
q
Therefore, p. 

When asking anchorites to establish the biblical or normative roots of certain "tradition-practices," they will employ the above fallacious reasoning.

Magisterial Protestant:  How can you prove that said practice is binding on Christians today?
Anchorite:  It is part of tradition.
Mag. Prot.: How do I know it is biblical tradition?
Anchorite:  We have apostolic succession.
Mag. Prot:  How do I know the apostles taught that certain practice?
Anchorite:  Paul told the churches to hold to the traditions.
Mag. Prot:  Can you define the content of those traditions?
Anchorite:  It is the practices you see today.

Did you see the sleight of hand?

Reasons on not holding to Apocryphal books

I had a long email discussion on the apocrypha with an Anchorite, most of it against my better choosing. Once you get past their "trap questions" on "how do you know which books are in the Bible," the discussion ends soon after.   The best thing is to start asking specific questions about Apocryphal books.   My normal line of approach was to start pointing out the errors in Tobit.    An anchorite will respond that the Bible also has "apparent errors."  Back-and-forth, back-and-forth.

Another line of approach is the historical-canonical one.  Turretin explains by way of syllogism:

Premise:  The Jews were entrusted with the oracles of God (which most would acknowledge as Old Testament).
Premise 2:   The apocrypha is absent from the Palestinian canon:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion:  the apocrypha is not "the oracles of God."

Federal Vision and Crumbling Ecclesiologies

This issue should be dead.  I won't rehash old theologies.  I have nothing to add to the discussion on the theological front.  I do have some final notes, conclusions which I take to be indisputable.

• Having studied Richard Muller's conclusion on Arminius, there are parallels between Arminius's rhetoric and tactics (leaving theological conclusions aside at this point) and those of the FV.
• Apropos above point:  The FV men are correct to note locations in Calvin and the 3 Forms which seem to support some of their conclusions.  The problem from an ecclesiastical perspective is that they are playing these conclusions against the subalternate normative standards of the Westminster Confession to which some have subscribed.
• The difference between ministerial and magisterial authority:  the Confession isn't infallible.  It doesn't have absolute authority.  It does however, have some authority of a ministerial sort.   Seeking contradictions between confessions and not bringing up differences within an ecclesiastical court is an attack upon that legitimate, if limited, authority.
• On a practical point, it is hard to read Leithart's book on baptism and apostasy and seriously affirm conclusions in the Westminster Confession of Faith.   I know quite a few people who have become Roman Catholic from reading that book.
• If Arminianism is a heresy ala Dort, and the FV is quite Arminian on conditional covenants, apostasy, and election, then the conclusion is inescapable. 

Two types of theological necessity

necessitas consequentiae (necessity of the consequences):  this is a hypothetical or non-absolute necessity.  It is brought about by a previous contingent act.  It refers to the necessity of the finite order.  There is no absolute necessity that God decree what he decrees, but since he has decreed so, he is bound to fulfill it.

necessitas consequentis (necessity of the consequent):  this is absolute necessity that refers to the opera ad intra.

Practical value of these distinctions:  it allows the theologian to intelligently and without confusion speak of both necessary and free acts.   Our acts are necessary in the sense that Providence is not subject to change.  But our acts are not absolutely necessary, since God was not bound to decree such.

Intro

I intend this blog to be formal in nature and to summarize research.  Themes:  issues related to Reformation and post-Reformation thought.  I want to deal with issues that aren't normally dealt with: theologia unionis, archetypal/ectypal theology, and the like.