Charles Hodge is the highpoint of American theology. While Dabney
searched deeper into the issues, Hodge’s position (if only because the
North won) allowed him a wider influence. Thornwell was the more
brilliant orator and Palmer the greater preacher, but Hodge was the
teacher and systematician. Of the Princetonians Hodge is supreme. His
writing style is smoother than Warfield’s and he is deeper than his
predecessors.
We rejoice that Hendrickson Publishing is issuing these three volumes
at $30. Even with the page-length quotations in Latin, Hodge is strong
where American Christianity is weak. A renaissance in Hodge would
reinvigorate discussions about epistemology, the doctrine of God and
God’s knowledge, justification, and God’s law. We will look at Hodge’s
discussion of epistemology, doctrine of God, human nature (including
both sin and free volition), soteriology, and ethics.
Common Sense Realism
Far from stultifying the gospel, Hodge’s position safeguards the
reliability of “truth-speak” and if taken seriously today, adds another
angle to the “convert” phenomenon. A properly basic belief is one that
doesn’t need another belief for justification. I’m not so sure if Hodge
is making that claim. However, he does anticipate some of Plantinga’s
positions by saying that God so constituted our nature to believe x, y,
and z. My aim is to show from Hodge’s own words that our cognitive
faculties are (1) reliable and (2) made so by God. I will advance upon
Hodge’s conclusions: a commoner can read the Bible and get the general
“gist” of it apart from an infallible interpreting body. Secondly, to
deny the above point attacks the image of God. Thirdly, to deny the
above point is to reduce all to irrationality. The practical
application: Those who deny this position often find themselves looking
for “absolute” and infallible arbiters of the faith. Such a position
denies a key aspect of our imago dei.
“Any doctrine [and Hodge is using this word in the
technical sense of philosophic and/or scientific beliefs], therefore,
which contradicts the facts of consciousness, or the laws of belief
which God has impressed upon our nature, must be false” (I: 215).
“Our knowledge of mind, therefore, as a thinking substance, is the
first and most certain, and the most indestructible of all forms of
knowledge; because it is involved in self-knowledge…which is the
indispensable condition of all knowledge” (I: 277).
It is interesting to note his reference to self-knowledge. One is reminded of Calvin’s duplex cognito dei.
Doctrine of God
…[S]tart with the revelation that God has made of himself in the
constitution of our own nature and in his holy word. This method leads
to the conclusion that God can think and act, that in him essence and
attributes are not identical (I: 564).
It’s also interesting to note Hodge’s comment about God constituting our nature in a certain way. Shades of Thomas Reid.
“To say, as the schoolmen, and so many even of Protestant
theologians, ancient and modern, were accustomed to say, that the
divine attributes differ only in name, or in our conceptions, or in
their effects, is to destroy all true knowledge of God…If in God
knowledge is identical with eternity, knowledge with power, power with
ubiquity, and ubiquity with holiness, then we are using words without
meaning (I: 371-372).
The attributes of God, therefore, are not merely different
conceptions in our minds, but different modes in which God reveals
himself to his creatures…just as our several faculties are different
modes in which the inscrutable substance self reveals itself in our
consciousness and acts (I: 374).
So what do we mean by simplicity? Rome has a thorough, if ultimately
chaotic, answer to this question. Orthodoxy has an outstanding response
to Rome, but nothing in terms of a constructive view of Simplicity.
Following Turretin, Hodge writes,
The attributes are to be distinguished not realiter,
but;”virtualiter, that is, there is a real foundation in the divine
nature for the several attributes attributed to him (I: 370).
What does virtualiter mean?
Richard Muller defines it as “literally, i.e., with virtue or power” (Muller 371).
It’s interesting that Muller mentioned “power.” This corresponds with
Radde-Galwitz’s interpretation of Gregory of Nyssa. Alluding to Michel
Barnes he notes that divine power is the causal capacity rooted in the
divine nature; inseparable from the divine nature and gives rise to the
divine energies (Barnes 183). Further, each “Good” (or attribute, in our
case) entails another.
Human Nature
Charles Hodge’s key argument regarding the free will controversy is
this: does infallible certainty of a future event destroy human liberty?
He answers no. Hodge gives a lengthy explanation that the Reformed
tradition can maintain free agency, yet God’s foreknowledge of future
actions is not threatened (Hodge, II: 296-304). Part of his discussion
is labored and a bit confusing, for he realizes that “free will” has as
many glosses as it does adherents. He explains what is and is not meant
by “free will.”
I do not always agree with his defining of the terms. He lists the
three options: necessity (fatalism), contingency (free-willism) and
certainty (Reformed and Augustinianism). My problem with Hodge’s list is
that traditional Reformed orthodoxy made a distinction between the
necessity of the consequent (absolute necessity as pertaining to God ad
intra) and necessity of the consequent thing (conditional necessity). My
problem with his term “contingency” is that it risks confusion: God is a
necessary being; man is a contingent one. It is evident, though, that
Hodge makes clear he means the semi-Pelagian options. He does advance
the discussion forward, though, with his use of the term “certainty.”
Hodge is content to show that opponents of the Reformed system cannot
demonstrate a contradiction between the proposition “all events are
foreknown by God and will happen with certainty,” and the proposition,
“Man can make rational choices apart from absolute necessity.” Hodge
lists several metaphysical and biblical examples. God is a most perfect
being. This is a certainty (else we are doomed!), yet few will argue
that God’s liberty is impinged. Jesus’s crucifixion was foreknown in the
mind of God, yet the Roman soldiers sinned most freely.
This raises an interesting issue: many semi-Pelagians try to duck the
Reformed charge by saying, “God simply foresees who will believe and
elects them based on his foreseeing their believing.” Besides being a
crass works-righteousness, does this really solve the problem? Is their
belief any less certain? If the semi-Pelagian argues that election is
God’s foreseeing their faith, then we must ask if this is a certain
action? It’s hard to see how they can say no. If they do affirm that it
is certain, then they must at least agree (hypothetically) with the
Reformed gloss that certainty does not destroy free agency.
So what does it mean for a man to act “freely.” Few people on either
side ever define this satisfactorily. Hodge loosely follows the standard
Reformed gloss: the will follows the intellect (which is assumed to be
fallen). Man can be said to act freely if he acts naturally: man acts
according to the way he was created (II: 304).
Imputation
One of the objections to the doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ
is that the transfer of guilt (ours/Adam’s) and/or the transfer of
righteousness (Christ’s) is morally and legally impossible. Hodge
answers:
“The transfer of guilt or righteousness, as states of
consciousness or forms of moral character, is indeed impossible. But the
real transfer of guilt as”a responsibility to justice, and as
righteousness which satisfies that justice,’ is no more impossible than
that one man should pay the debt of another. All that the bible teaches
on the subject is that Christ paid as a substitute our debt to the
justice of God” (II: 540-541).
Justification
Vol. 3: 114ff
Hodge gives a wonderful and penetrating treatment on justification.
He notes that The nature of the act of justification Does not produce
subjective change. It is an Act of God not in his character of sovereign
but in character of judge (speech-act?)
Includes both pardon and declaration that believer is just in the
sight of the law. It is not saying that the believer is morally just in
terms of character. The believer is just in relation to the law–guilt is
expiated (120). It is not mere pardon: sinner’s guilt is expiated
(125). Mere Pardon does not produce reconciliation (128).
Scriptural usage:
Dt 25:1. Judge pronounces a judgment. He does not effect a character
change. Condemnation is the opposite of justify. A sentence of
condemnation does not effect an evil character change. Thus, if sentence
of condemnation is judicial act, so is justification (123).
Romanist Views
Infusion of righteousness does nothing for guilt (though possibly they
would say the guilt is washed away in baptism). Accordingly,
justification does nothing for the satisfaction of justice. Even if the
Romanist claim that justification makes me holy were true, I would still
be liable to justice (133).
Satisfaction of Justice
An adequate theory of justification must account for satisfying justice (130). Nothing “within” me can do that.
Works of the Law
Scripture never designates specifically “what kind of works” (137). The
word “law” is used in a comprehensive sense. Nomos binds the heart–law
of nature. Not ceremonial. Paul says “thou shalt not covet” as the law
that condemns me (Romans 7). Not ceremonial. Grace and works are
antithetical. It doesn’t make sense to subdivide works (138).
Ground
The Ground of justification is always what is done for us, not what is in us
- justified by his blood (Romans 5:19)
- by his righteousness (5:18)
- If just means “morally good,” then it would be absurd to say that one man is just because of another (141).
- We say that the claims against him are satisfied.
- When God justifies the ungodly, he does not declare him morally godly, but that his sins are expiated.
Hypothetical Objections Proves Protestant View
Why object over possible antinomianism if faith alone not true (Romans 6; p. 140)?
The Law of God
Like older Reformed systematics, Hodge has a treatment of the Decalogue.
Much of it is common fare. What is interesting is the way he handled
it. By reading his arguments we see a commentary on problematic cultural
issues. Of particular importance, which I won’t develop here, are his
expositions of the 4th and 7th commandment. In the latter he
specifically deals with Romanist tyranny in marriage.
Throughout the whole discussion he is combating Jesuitism. We do not
see that today. Modern systematics, even conservative ones, are scared
of appearing “conspiratorial.” Hodge’s age was a
manlier
age. They called it for what it was. They knew that Jesuits swear an
oath to destroy Protestant nations by any means necessary. And they knew
that only the Law of God provides spiritual and political liberty.
This is why God doesn’t take conservative, political evangelicalism
seriously today.
Hodge is not entirely clear, though. When he wants to prove the
Levitical prohibitions as binding today on sanguinuity and close-kin
marriage, he argues like Greg Bahnsen. Almost word for word. If he did
that today he would be fired. But when he wants to argue against more
theocratic penalties, he sounds like a dispensationalist.
Sacraments
Keith Mathison’s book on Calvin’s view of the Supper is now something of
a classic, and deservedly so. I am in large agreement with most of the
book. I certainly lean towards Calvin. That said, I think one of the
unintended consequences of the book is a slighting of Charles Hodge
among the “Young Turk Calvinists.” It’s not that I disagree with
Mathison or Calvin, but I am concerned about the new interest in Nevin. I
used to be a hard-core Hegelian for 3 years. Nevin was also an
Hegelian. Granted, Nevin pulled back from the worst of Hegel. I am not
so sure Nevin’s modern interpreters fully understand that. I hope to
give something of a modified defense of Hodge on the Supper:
“really conveying to the believing recipient, Christ, and
all the benefits of his redemption…There must be a sense, therefore, in
which believers receive the body and blood of Christ” (III: 622).
However,
Anything is said to be present when it operates duly on our
perceiving senses” (637). I am not so sure Hodge is able to dodge
Mathison’s charge. I agree with Hodge’s common sense realism, but I
don’t think Hodge’s next point follows: “In like manner Christ is
present when he thus fills the mind, sheds abroad his love into our
hearts…” (638). I suppose the question at issue is this: we grant that
Christ fills the mind. We grant that sensory operations also fill the
mind, but it does not necessarily follow that Christ is present in the
Supper in a sensory manner. In some sense I think all Reformed would
agree with that.
Hodge makes the common Reformed point that “what is affirmed to be
present is not the body and blood of Christ absolutely, but his body as
broken and his blood as shed” (641). This is a decisive point against
High Church traditions: when they insist upon a literal reading, “This
is my body,” the Reformed can point that Christ’s wasn’t sacrificed yet,
so the “body” at issue can’t be the sacrificial body.
Hodge concludes his exposition of the Reformed teaching with “There
is therefore a presence of Christ’s body in the Lord’s Supper; not local
but spiritual; not to the senses, but to the mind and to faith; and not
of nearness, but of efficacy” (643).
The Problem with Nevin
Throughout the work is a running attack on Nevin’s theology. Hodge makes
a point that isn’t always grasped by Nevin’s defenders today: if we
accept Nevin’s platonic essentialism, especially with regard to the
Eucharist and Christology, then we run into huge problems. If Christ
assumed the universal humanity, then he also assumed the rules of
predicating of genus: the more universal a genus, the less specific it
is. If Christ is the universal humanity, then there is nothing
specifically human about him!
Evaluation
It is superfluous to sing of Hodge’s greatness. That is a given. I do
have some issues with his treatment. Hodge routinely appeals to the
“received consensus of the church” for many of his doctrines. There are
several problems with this. Aside from the most general teachings from
the Creeds, appeals to the Patrum Consensus are problematic and
question-begging. Further, the Eastern Orthodox Church, to which Hodge
sometimes appeals, would not share his assumptions about Adam’s imputed
guilt, for example.